Emory International Law Review
Volume 30
Issue 2 Theme Issue: Peace and Conflict Resolution in Syria
2015

Social Media and Conflict Mapping in Syria: Implications for
Peacemaking, International Criminal Prosecutions and for TRC
Processes
Paul J. Zwier
Emory University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/eilr

Recommended Citation
Paul J. Zwier, Social Media and Conflict Mapping in Syria: Implications for Peacemaking, International
Criminal Prosecutions and for TRC Processes, 30 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 169 (2015).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/eilr/vol30/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Emory Law Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Emory International Law Review by an authorized editor of Emory Law Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact law-scholarly-commons@emory.edu.

ZWIER GALLEYSPROOFS2

12/14/2015 11:03 AM

SOCIAL MEDIA AND CONFLICT MAPPING IN SYRIA:
IMPLICATIONS FOR PEACEMAKING, INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS AND FOR TRC PROCESSES
Paul J. Zwier∗
ABSTRACT
Early 2015 evidenced the first signs that Syria may soon be facing a transition
from its present form of government into a new transitional government following
the end of its civil war. Ideally, the transitional period will provide Syria with a
secure and principled basis for governing until a full constitutional process can be
employed and will also start the process of Syria’s taking steps forward toward
healing and reconciliation between the parties. Toward the later end, the
transitional period will require Syrian peacemakers to select among options for
how to best deal with past atrocities committed by the parties in pursuit of their
war aims. This Article reviews five of these options and argues that Syrians should
adopt a mix of formal judicial proceedings for those it does not grant amnesty to in
order to get a peace agreement, and an informal yet principled mediation process
during a transitional period for disputes that arise from the actions of rebel group
activities. These later disputes should be followed by a process with a hybrid court
for those who do not gain adequate resolution of their disputes through the
informal mediation process.
This Article also argues that the incorporation and strategic use of social
media postings by Syrians into conflict mapping projects presents important
possibilities for providing the proof needed for assessing an individual’s criminal
responsibility and a way for Syria to make a meaningful trade between seeking
justice for past criminal wrongdoing and providing reconciliation between parties
at an informal local level. Even if no peace transition is actually constituted in
Syria, this Article should be useful in providing an analysis of transitional options
for similar countries in the Middle East in a process of transitioning from a
dictatorship to a democratic form of government.

∗ Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law, Director, Emory Center for Advocacy and
Dispute Resolution. Consultant with The Carter Center, and other international rule-of-law projects in the
Middle East, China, Russia, Mexico and Africa since 2005.
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INTRODUCTION
Early 2015 evidenced the first signs that Syria may soon be facing a
transition from its present form of government into a new transitional
government following the end of its civil war.1 Ideally, the transitional period
will need to provide Syria with a secure and principled basis for governing
until a full constitutional process can be employed to bring about a new
constitution and elections for a new government. It will also start the process
of Syria’s taking steps forward toward healing and reconciliation between the
parties. Toward the later end, the transition period will require Syrian
peacemakers to select among the options for how to best deal with past
atrocities committed by the parties in pursuit of their war aims. There are five
options to consider: (1) design a transitional process that removes the current
leadership of the military and security forces; (2) make little or no provisions
for dealing with past war crimes on either side; (3) seek the jurisdiction of the
International Criminal Court (ICC) to deal with past atrocities; (4) rely on the
process of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) to manage past
disputes; or (5) rely on its national legal structures to prosecute individuals for
the commission of their war crimes. The incorporation of social media postings
by Syrians into conflict mapping projects presents important possibilities for
support of the fifth option. It may provide a way for Syria to make a
meaningful trade between seeking justice for past criminal wrongdoing and
providing reconciliation between parties at an informal local level.
Part I will review each of these options and argue that Syrians should adopt
a mix of formal judicial proceedings for those it does not grant amnesty to in
order to get a peace agreement, and an informal yet principled mediation
process during a transitional period for disputes that arise from the actions of
rebel group activities. These later disputes should be followed by a process
1 See generally Anne Barnard, U.N. Envoy Says Assad is Crucial to Defusing Conflict in Syria, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/14/world/middleeast/un-envoy-to-syria-says-assadis-crucial-to-hopes-to-end-war.html. The U.N. has once again started the process of reviving peace talks,
which started in Geneva in 2011 and resulted in a second round of talks in 2014. See id. The United States has
also seemed to drop its demand that Assad leave office, perhaps making more room for a negotiated solution to
end the conflict. See Anne Barnard & Somini Sengupta, U.S. Signals Shift on How to End Syrian Civil War,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/20/world/middleeast/us-support-for-syriapeace-plans-demonstrates-shift-in-priorities.html?_r=0. There are also reports, denied by the Russians, that
they may abandon their support for the Assad government in exchange for Saudi reduction in oil production.
Mark Mazzetti, Eric Schmitt & David D. Kirkpatrick, Saudi Oil is Seen as Lever to Pry Russian Support from
Syria’s Assad, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/04/world/middleeast/saudiarabia-is-said-to-use-oil-to-lure-russia-away-from-syrias-assad.html.
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with a hybrid court for those who do not gain adequate resolution of their
disputes through the informal mediation process. This option will best deal
with the lessons learned in other Middle Eastern post-conflict transitions, and,
while presenting some risks, will also best provide for the need for peace at the
local level under a transition period that is relatively easy to execute, has a low
cost, and avoids the glare of publicity. Applying both a pragmatic and yet
principled criteria (peace first, low cost, easy to execute) will best guide Syria
as it seeks the stability needed to grow the peace process into its next stage of
development.
In Part II, this Article will argue that recent developments in the use of
social media (with special emphasis on YouTube videos posted on Facebook
and Twitter, and attached to emails) and the ability of various international
monitoring groups, including the United Nations (U.N.), to map the conflict in
Syria will greatly assist the efficacy of the fifth option by not only providing
the proof needed for assessing an individual’s criminal responsibility, but also
by making possible a more meaningful informal mediation process. Strategic
use by the U.N. and its partners of these conflict mapping capabilities presents
new potentials for realistic reconciliation between individual victims and those
who have committed criminal atrocities. Even if no peace transition is actually
constituted in Syria, this Article should be useful in providing an analysis of
transitional options in similar countries in the Middle East that are also in a
process of transitioning from a dictatorship to a democratic form of
government.
I. OPTIONS FOR POLITICAL TRANSITION IN SYRIA
Much of what will end up dictating the final choice of which political
option the Syrians end up choosing will be the result of the conditions for the
final ending of hostilities. For example, if the parties themselves meet and
reach a settlement, without interference from the international community or
regional powerbrokers, the political transition will likely look much different
than one brokered by either the Russians, or in turn one brokered by the U.N.
Still, it is important to understand the merits of each option so that the parties
can be aware of the risks and tradeoffs that are made under each option. After
disposing of the first three options rather quickly, this Article will explore in
more depth the other two options that are available if the international
community, and the U.N. in particular, becomes the broker of the eventual
peace agreement between the Syrian government and the opposition groups.
Where the U.N. becomes involved, the dilemmas between making peace and
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setting up the conditions for transitional justice are more acute. The U.N. as an
institution has to weigh the future deterrent impact on rogue states if it brokers
a peace with impunity for past atrocities. It will help explain why the fifth
option will likely be the option that emerges where the U.N. is involved in the
peace process.
A. What to Do with the Syrian Military and Security Forces During the
Transitional Period—Removing vs. Ignoring
Syrian decision-makers will be informed by recent events in Iraq, as well as
the ongoing efforts in transitional governance processes taking place in Egypt,
Libya, and Tunisia. Regardless of the power sharing or power transition
mechanisms the Syrians eventually employ during their transitional period,
they will face the question of how to best ensure the long-term stability of the
country without repeating the mistakes of transitions brought about by powersharing arrangements with the military. In other words, Syria will need to
figure out how it will avoid creating the circumstances that now threaten the
stability of governance structures in Iraq, Egypt, and Libya, if indeed Syrians
choose to eventually use a democratic form of government.
Iraq, Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia present a wide spectrum of how to best set
up a transition process after a conflict and regime change. At one end of the
spectrum is Iraq, which allegedly tried to clean house by removing much of
Saddam Hussein’s military from the Iraqi military at the end of the war.2 Some
have made the argument that how the Iraqis dealt with Saddam Hussein’s
military and security forces in the aftermath of the Iraqi war has led to the
instability the Iraqis now face.3 A number of former Sunni/Hussein military
leaders are now involved in the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, more
commonly known as ISIS, having been summarily initially dismissed by the
2 See Ben Hubbard & Eric Schmitt, Military Skill and Terrorist Technique Fuel Success of ISIS, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 27, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/28/world/middleeast/army-know-how-seen-asfactor-in-isis-successes.html. The article goes on to report what it has learned from conflict mapping of the war
in Iraq and Syria. “According to a map of the group developed by Mr. Alhashimi, the Iraqi expert, Mr.
Baghdadi has 25 deputies across Iraq and Syria. About one-third were military officers during Mr. Hussein’s
rule, and nearly all were imprisoned by American forces.” Id.
3 Samia Nakhoul, Saddam's Former Army is the Secret to ISIS Success, BUS. INSIDER (June 16, 2015),
http://www.businessinsider.com/r-saddams-former-army-is-secret-of-baghdadis-success-2015-6. “The sectarian approach of Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki drove the Sunni minority in Iraq to support any group that
could reverse its increasing marginalization, which led to Sunni tribal support of the Islamic State.” RICHARD
BARRETT, SOUFAN GROUP, THE ISLAMIC STATE 5 (2014), http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/
10/TSG-The-Islamic-State-Nov14.pdf.
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Coalition government.4 Former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s
sectarian and authoritarian policies isolated Sunnis from Iraqi politics, leading
former military leaders, who Maliki removed from the Iraqi military, to
support the insurgency.5 Many now criticize the Iraqi government (and the
U.S.) for not paying adequate attention to what should be done with the over
ninety thousand mostly-Sunni military personnel during the post-conflict
transition.6 Some of the Sunni tribal leaders, who had past Iraqi military
experience, were thereafter formed into a group called “the Awakening” to
help the United States and Iraqi governments fight Al-Qaeda.7 The Awakening
forces were paid, trained, and given weapons by the United States.8 Thereafter,
some of these Sunnis left the Awakening and eventually joined ISIS when they
felt snubbed and excluded by Maliki’s Shi’a government.9 The lesson from the
Iraqi experience for peacemaking in Syria may be that the Syrians should not
take steps to exclude or remove or separately treat all of Assad’s military and
security forces, and instead consider how to integrate members of opposition
military groups into the Syrian army or they will potentially form a potent
force for instability going forward.
On the other end of the spectrum are the transitional structures used by
Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia in the aftermath of their recent revolutions. In
Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood negotiated with Egypt’s Supreme Military
Council after many in the military had grown tired of Hosni Mubarak and
granted it immunity for any role it played in past atrocities.10 Having granted
4 See Hubbard & Schmitt, supra note 2 (discussing that several of Saddam Hussein’s former officers
serve as top military leaders for Abu Bakr al-Bagdahdi); Mark Thompson, How Disbanding the Iraqi Army
Fueled ISIS, TIME (May 28, 2015), http://time.com/3900753/isis-iraq-syria-army-united-states-military/.
5 See Marc Lynch, How Can the U.S. Help Maliki When Maliki’s the Problem?, WASH. POST: MONKEY
CAGE (June 12, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/06/12/iraq-trappedbetween-isis-and-maliki/.
6 See Timothy Williams & Duraid Adnan, Sunnis in Iraq Allied with U.S. Rejoin Rebels, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 16, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/17/world/middleeast/17awakening.html?pagewanted=all&_
r=0.
7 See id.; Zachary Laub & Jonathan Masters, The Islamic State, COUNCIL FOREIGN REL., http://
www.cfr.org/iraq/islamic-state/p14811 (last updated May 18, 2015).
8 Williams & Adnan, supra note 6.
9 See id.; see also Jonathan Broder, Iraq’s ISIS Fight Could Be a Second Awakening, NEWSWEEK (Jan.
27, 2015), http://www.newsweek.com/2015/02/06/awakening-part-ii-301906.html. Most recently, there are
reports that some of these same Awakening members are willing to now support the efforts against ISIS by
forming a new group called the Awakening II. Id.; Laub & Masters, supra note 7.
10 See David D. Kirkpatrick, In Egypt, Signs of Accord Between Military Council and Islamists, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 22, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/23/world/middleeast/signs-of-accord-betweenegyptian-military-and-muslim-brotherhood-on-new-charter.html?pagewanted=all.
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amnesty, it did nothing to remove the military from reasserting power. After a
brief period of a Muslim Brotherhood-led government, the Egyptian Military
stepped in and took back control of the country.11 The Military Council has,
once again, taken control of the country, and has recently taken a series of
steps that suggest its desires to put stability ahead of democracy.12 The lesson
appears to be that without sufficient guarantees that the military leadership will
not reassert itself, Syria will run the risk that the Assad military will return to
power.
B. Make No Provision for Dealing with Military or Security Leadership
In the case of Libya and Tunisia, no provision was made as to how past
military leadership was to fare during the transitional period. Gaddafi’s
military was destroyed, making it impossible to restore order during the
interim period.13 The Libyan failure to try to resurrect or reform a new military
may have created the sources of instability that have returned the various tribal
groups to violence.14 On the other hand, in Tunisia, not making express
accommodations with the military seems to have worked out quite well.15 In
Tunisia, the existing military tacitly agreed to submit to the decisions of its
“Constituent Assembly” and confined itself to taking actions against jihadists
and gasoline traffickers.16 In the Tunisian case, the transitional period only
provided for a legislative body to rule on any issues that arose during the
transitional period, and its peace agreement never dealt explicitly with past
criminal actions by the government.
Some look to Tunisia for an example of an Islamic State that has resisted
the forces of radicalism and has continued to hold together as a secular
democracy that is committed to religious freedom under the auspices of a
secular Constitution. Again, there are important differences between Syria and
11 See Daria Solovieva, Egypt’s Military Takes Control over Muslim Brotherhood, Supporters, WASH.
TIMES (Aug. 18, 2013), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/aug/18/egypts-military-takes-controlover-muslim-brotherh/#ixzz3XUCpoFbQ.
12 See id.
13 See Simon Tisdall, Muammar Gaddafi’s Violent Death Leaves Libya at a Crossroads, GUARDIAN
(Oct. 20, 2011), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/oct/20/gaddafi-death-leaves-libya-cross
roads.
14 See NATO Chief Admits Efforts to Stabilize Post-Gaddafi Libya Failed, RT NEWS (May 14, 2015),
http://www.rt.com/news/258741-nato-admits-libya-fail/.
15 Souhail Belhadj, Tunisia: An Exemplary Political Transition? (Sept. 10, 2014) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Center).
16 Id.
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Tunisia that must be factored into Syria’s case. In Tunisia’s case, its
transitional period was supported by a strong labor movement, capable of
shutting down the government if the unions did not like the radical direction of
some of its more extreme actors.17 Ironically, it was also supported by a
tradition of a more conservative use of military power in the hands of its
previously ruling dictator, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali.18 Tunisia’s military and
security services did not have the same tradition, capacity, and reputation for
dealing ruthlessly and violently against its citizens.19 The Syrians might
wonder, then, whether the situation in Tunisia is likely to be predictive of the
results of the transitional structures used by the Tunisians, or whether the
mostly Alawite security forces would act more like the Egyptian military
should the leadership in a transition period start to take a turn against them.
Without a strong labor influence or other social political movement to
counteract the Syrian military’s involvement, the risks of not dealing directly
with the military leaders are likely to later derail the transition period.
C. The War Crimes of Assad’s Military and Security Forces and the
International Criminal Court
Should the transitional plan for Syria include an appeal to the ICC, as in
Liberia and Kenya, in the wake of conflicts there? The transitional government
that might be negotiated in Syria could include a power-sharing agreement that
might contain provisions that commit the country to a number of U.N.
resolutions.20 In the case of Liberia, these resolutions included an agreement
17 Id.; Sarah Chayes, How a Leftist Labor Union Helped Force Tunisia’s Political Settlement, CARNEGIE
ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE (Mar. 27, 2014), http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/03/27/how-leftist-laborunion-helped-force-tunisia-s-political-settlement.
18 See generally LANDRY SIGNE & REMY SMIDA, STAN. CTR. ON DEMOCRACY, DEV., AND THE RULE OF
LAW, THE ARMY’S DECISION TO REPRESS: A TURNING POINT IN TUNISIA’S REGIME CHANGE (Apr. 2014),
http://cddrl.fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/Landry_Final.pdf.
19 See id. at 6–7; James Fromson, Tunisia’s Transition, INT’L INST. STRATEGIC STUD. (Feb. 27, 2014),
http://www.iiss.org/en/iiss%20voices/blogsections/iiss-voices-2014-b4d9/february-72f2/tunisia-transitiond9e8 (discussing the neutrality of Tunisia’s military).
20 See Associated Press, Syria’s Assad Vows to Comply with UN Resolution, CBC NEWS (Sept. 29, 2013),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/syria-s-assad-vows-to-comply-with-un-resolution-1.1872522. Discussion of this
option in the present historical context may seem somewhat naïve. Why would Assad agree to submit to U.N.
resolutions when he has not been defeated? On the other hand, Assad did agree to submit to chemical weapons
inspections when political pressure was applied. He also has denied that he has done anything wrong, and that
charges that he has used chemical weapons or barrel bombs have been trumped up by the West. Perhaps
implicit in that denial is a logical trap—that if you have not done anything wrong, why not submit to the U.N.
resolutions and the ICC’s jurisdiction? Still, great pressure would likely have to be brought to bear on Assad
and to get him to agree to submit to the ICC. As discussed below, Assad will likely have to be given some sort
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that past and potential ongoing human rights violations would be submitted
during the transitional period to the ICC.21 The Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (CPA) also included a provision that membership in opposition
military groups would not exclude those members from taking part in the
political process.22
The capacity of an international criminal court (first the International
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), then the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the International Criminal Tribunal for Sierra
Leone, and now the ICC) to successfully prosecute past heads of state is
mixed. By 2003, the time of Liberia’s CPA, the ICTY had prosecuted a
number of government leaders who engaged in war crimes under the Rome
Statute, including Slobodan Milošević, and so Liberian peacemakers had
precedent to expect an international prosecution of Charles Taylor.23 After
getting Kenya to turn over Taylor to the ICC, the ICC secured the conviction
of Taylor, but did not successfully bring to judgment any other leader in the
military leadership in Liberia.24 The ICC has since issued warrants for the
arrest of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir of Sudan25 and Uhuru Kenyatta of
Kenya.26 This time, the ICC failed to produce convictions of the Presidents,
though it spurred on successful Kenyan prosecutions of less prominent
political and military figures.27 The ICC has announced it will no longer

of amnesty. The question remains, then, how many others in the leadership of the government would have to
be given amnesty, or how many of them might be forced to submit to the ICC. See generally JUDITH S. YAPHE,
NAT’L DEF. U. CTR FOR STRATEGIC RES., INST. FOR NAT’L STRATEGIC STUDIES, NEXT STEPS IN SYRIA (Dec.
2013), http://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism_4-syria/Next_Steps_in_Syria.pdf.
21 See S.C. Res. 1970, ¶¶ 4–8 (Feb. 26, 2011).
22 Powersharing Transition Government: Accra Peace Agreement, U. NOTRE DAME KROC INST. FOR
INT’L PEACE STUDIES, http://peaceaccords.nd.edu/provision/powersharing-transitional-government-accrapeace-agreement (last visited Nov. 5, 2015); Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between the Government of
Liberia and the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for
Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and Political Parties, Aug. 18, 2013, http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/
file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/liberia_08182003.pdf.
23 See Marlise Simons, Ex-President of Liberia Aided War Crimes, Court Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/27/world/africa/charles-taylor-liberia-sierra-leone-war-crimes-courtverdict.html.
24 See Fred van der Kraaij, Will Charles Taylor End up Being Africa’s Only Former President Convicted
of War Crimes?, LIBERIAN PERSPECTIVES (Sept. 29, 2013), http://blog.liberiapastandpresent.org/?p=590.
25 Rep. of the Int’l Criminal Court at its Seventh Session, Report on the Activities of the Court, ICCASP/7/25 (Nov. 14-22, 2008), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP7/ICC-ASP-7-25%20English.pdf.
26 LIONEL NICHOLS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE END OF IMPUNITY IN KENYA 82
(Springer Int’l Publishing 2015).
27 Id. at 250.

ZWIER GALLEYSPROOFS2

2015]

SOCIAL MEDIA AND CONFLICT MAPPING IN SYRIA

12/14/2015 11:03 AM

177

prosecute Uhuru Kenyatta and Omar Bashir because of a lack of cooperation
from the international community.28 Still, the ICC remains a major force in
potentially bringing to justice at least some of the country’s leadership for its
promulgation of war crimes against its civilian population. What will be
necessary in order to make this happen is either for the Security Council to
back the ICC’s efforts, or for the Syrians themselves to decide to submit to the
jurisdiction of the court.
Since the backing of Russia is unlikely,29 the issue is whether the Syrian
opposition forces can get the Assad government to agree to a transitional
government without at least giving amnesty to some of its leaders. The ICC
lacks jurisdiction over Syria, which is not a signatory to the Rome Statute,
absent the transitional government making a request for its help (like in the
cases of Liberia and Kenya).30
The situation for Syrian peacemakers will be made all the more difficult
because they will face enormous resistance to giving Assad these assurances.
Such resistance will come from victims and the families of victims of Assad’s
government’s war crimes. In addition, resistance will come from some
members of the international community who will likely not be willing to
support the Syrian transitional period if it appears that the Assad government
will be granted impunity for any of its past war crimes. The situation in Kenya
is telling. Following the U.N.-negotiated power-sharing arrangement between
Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga following the 2007 post-election violence
between the two’s supporters, the parties had agreed to submit to the ICC’s
jurisdiction for any violation of the Rome Statute.31 One who was allegedly
engaged in a violation of the Rome Statute was Kenya’s later-elected
President, Uhuru Kenyatta. Support for Kenyatta’s government has been a long

28 Id. at 126, 250. See Adam Taylor, Even at the International Criminal Court, Some Will Always be
Above the Law, WASH. POST (Dec. 5, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/12/
05/even-at-the-international-criminal-court-some-will-always-be-above-the-law/; Sommini Sengupta, Omar
al-Bashir Case Shows International Criminal Court’s Limitations, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2015), http://www.
nytimes.com/2015/06/16/world/africa/sudan-bashir-international-criminal-court.html.
29 Russia has vetoed other resolutions aimed at Syria. Rick Gladstone, Friction at the U.N. as Russia and
China Veto Another Resolution on Syria Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/07/20/world/middleeast/russia-and-china-veto-un-sanctions-against-syria.html?_r=0.
30 As of September 2015, Syria has not ratified the Rome Statute. Miriam Morfino, Kenyatta Case at the
ICC: Three Options Available for the ICC Judges, AM. NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORG. COALITION FOR INT’L
CRIM. CT. (Oct. 20, 2014), http://amicc.blogspot.com/2014/10/kenyatta-case-at-icc-three-options.html.
31 NICHOLS, supra note 26, at 85.
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time in coming because of his indictment, and that support continues to be
tepid, despite the ICC dropping its case against him.32
The legal case against Assad seems strong, should the ICC be granted
jurisdiction. Assad has now been at war with his own citizens since 2010. He,
or individuals in his government, are likely responsible for a number of war
crimes and, at a minimum, have much explaining to do. The United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reports that close to half of the
Syrian population (10.8 million out of a country of close to 22 million), has
been directly affected by violence since the start of the civil war.33 Over six
million people have been internally displaced.34 Additionally, 3.8 million
Syrians have already registered as refugees in the UNHCR.35 The organization
Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reports that over 200,000 Syrians have
died in the conflict as of January 1, 2015, 17,790 of whom were civilians and
over 3,000 of whom were children.36 Over one million Syrians have been
wounded.37

32

Morfino, supra note 30.
2015 UNHCR Country Operations Profile—Syrian Arab Republic, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/
pages/49e486a76.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2015).
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Rick Gladstone & Mohammad Ghannam, Syria Deaths Hit New High in 2014, Observer Group Says,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/02/world/middleeast/syrian-civil-war-2014deadliest-so-far.html?_r=0.
37 Id.
33
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In addition, the Assad government faces allegations for the use of chemical
weapons against its citizens, and also in its use of barrel bombs,39 which are
said to kill indiscriminately, and therefore violate standards of humanitarian
law. There is also substantial evidence that members of the Syrian security
forces have engaged in torture, unlawful detention, and murder.40 As we will
see, the evidence for these acts includes the use of publically available social
media postings;41 most damning is the evidence gained from YouTube videos.
For Syrians now concerned with how to make peace but not create impunity to
the Syrian regime for these past acts, the exchange is difficult—which is more
important, to make peace or secure justice for past victims? They may be
looking for a different process that will provide sufficient guarantees to some
38 Syrian Government Bombardment of Opposition-Held Districts in Aleppo, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July
30, 2014), https://www.hrw.org/video-photos/image/2014/07/30/syrian-government-bombardment-oppositionheld-districts-aleppo.
39 Syria: Barrage of Barrel Bombs, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 30, 2014), http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/
07/30/syria-barrage-barrel-bombs (containing maps with documented evidence of barrel bombs).
40 Syria: Political Detainees Tortured, Killed, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct. 3, 2013), http://www.hrw.org/
news/2013/10/03/syria-political-detainees-tortured-killed.
41 See infra Part II.
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of the top leadership to end the conflict, but still hold out the possibility of a
process that will at least shed light on what had been done by the government,
and why it used forces against its own citizens.
One possibility would be to turn to the process used by South Africa in its
transition away from an apartheid government. There, the transition period
included the use of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).42 The
South African TRC, therefore, bears a hard look to determine whether its use
might be appropriate for Syrians.
D. A Truth and Reconciliation Commission
In between the extremes described above (cleaning house and negotiating
immunity, or effectively giving the military a pass by not taking any action
against them), some have argued instead for the transitional structures used by
South Africa.43 In South Africa, the military was not given immunity for past
war crimes, but South African opposition groups, led by Nelson Mandela,
agreed to give up on a formal criminal prosecution if the South African
government agreed to submit to a Truth and Reconciliation process to deal
with past criminal acts.44 The TRC agreement provided for the possibility of
amnesty if an individual came forward and told the truth about what
happened.45 South Africa is often held out as the most successful transition
between apartheid and democracy as it was able to maintain its military power
structures, and yet its military eventually succumbed to the authority of its
President, Nelson Mandela.46 South Africa’s transitional period was
orchestrated through the legal vehicle of an interim constitution, which set up a

42 Note that the ICC did not exist at the time of the South African transition. While an international war
crimes tribunal was a theoretical possibility, South Africa decided to take control of its own process for
dealing with the past.
43 NEL MARAIS & JO DAVIES, DECONSTRUCTING THE CONDITIONS THAT ENABLED SOUTH AFRICA’S
TRANSITION TO POWER-SHARING 1 (2014) (“This paper has been prepared for the Norwegian Peacebuilding
Resource Centre, The Carter Center and Swisspeace for a seminar of ‘The Syria Transition Options project of
The Carter Center.’”). See also Padraig O’Malley, Record of Understanding 26 September 1992, O’MALLEY
ARCHIVES (Sept. 26, 1992), https://www.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv02039/04lv02046/
05lv02092/06lv02096.htm.
44 See Desmond Tutu, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, South Africa (TRC), ENCYC. BRITANNICA
(Jan. 3, 2014), http://www.britannica.com/topic/Truth-and-Reconciliation-Commission-South-Africa.
45 See Jay A. Vora & Erika Vora, The Effectiveness of South Africa’s Truth & Reconciliation
Commission: Perceptions of Xhosa, Afrikaner, and English South Africans, 34 J. BLACK STUD. 301, 302, 305–
06 (2004).
46 Id. at 301–07.
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five-year period of power sharing, but then led to the adoption of a new
constitutional democracy when F.W. de Klerk resigned in the third year of the
transitional period and Mandela formed his majority government. The South
African military stood behind Mandela and submitted to his executive
authority even though de Klerk resigned.47 Some attribute the success of this
period to South Africa’s immediate use of its TRC.48 They attribute to the TRC
the impetus for at least delaying somewhat the African National Congress
(ANC) and its desire for revenge, and led instead to a gradual reconciliation
that is still working itself out in South African’s law and politics.49 Could such
a transition be worked out in Syria between the Assad government and the
rebel groups?
1. Potential Difficulties with a TRC in Syria
International advisors caution Syria on being too quick to hold up the
relatively successful transitions to democracy that occurred in South Africa
because of the substantial historical and political differences between Syria and
the South African situation.50 Syrians might worry that there were a number of
additional factors that led to the success of the transitional period. First, the
courage of de Klerk to initially seek out Mandela as a bargaining partner is
now missing in actions of the Assad government leadership. Second, the South
African situation is different from Syria’s because of Mandela’s moral
standing, from which he could make the claim for himself and other victims,
that South Africa needed peace more than justice. Again, who among the
Syrian opposition has the standing of Nelson Mandela? Third, Desmond Tutu
and the church played a significant role in arguing for an end to apartheid.
Finally, South Africa was uniquely left alone during its transition period, and
the regional powers in the Middle East are unlikely to follow suit. In the case
of Syria, there are a number of regional players with various stakes in the
different groups vying for power. The Iranians are said to have too much to
lose should Assad fall, as they support the Shia groups and their offshoot, the

47

MARAIS & DAVIES, supra note 43, at 8–9.
See generally INDEP. BOARD INQUIRY (IBI), REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1994 (1994), http://
www.historicalpapers.wits.ac.za/inventories/inv_pdfo/AG2543/AG2543-2-2-44-01-jpeg.pdf.
49 MARAIS & DAVIES, supra note 43, at 27.
50 Vora & Vora, supra note 45, at 303–04, 320. See also Mark N. Katz, Syria: Prospects for Transition
from Minority to Majority Rule, E-INT’L REL. (June 16, 2012), http://e-ir.info/2012/06/16/syria-prospects-fortransition-from-minority-to-majority-rule/.
48
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Alawis,51 while the Saudis support Sunni Salafists,52 and the Turks and Qataris
support the Muslim Brotherhood.53 Without Russian and U.S. involvement,
there is fear that a removal of Assad will result in a power vacuum and all the
tragedy, which will most likely follow, brought about by the situation created
by a failed state.54
In any event, what seemed essential to what South Africa achieved was a
trade that was made during the peace process between seeking justice against
those who had orchestrated apartheid and doing what was necessary to make
peace work for a transition to an integrated society. As Desmond Tutu
famously once said, what South Africa needed was “the truth, more than
justice.”55 His intent was evidenced in his leadership in the writing of the
South African Truth and Reconciliation Preamble.56 Importantly, the South
African TRC was expressly provided for in the enactment of the new South
African Constitution.57 As a result, the TRC avoided the legal trap that
otherwise exists when TRCs are created independent of the nation’s founding
documents: that any later prosecutions arising from the TRCs processes are
extra-legal because the TRC has no jurisdiction.
The question will be whether the Assad regime will ever agree to a
transitional period that uses a TRC. On the one hand, it is hard for any rational
51 Nathan Gonzalez, Solving the Sunni-Shia Conflict Begins with Tehran, DIPLOMAT (May 23, 2014),
http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/solving-the-sunni-shia-conflict-begins-with-tehran/.
52 Ed Husain, ISIS Atrocities Started With Saudi Support for Salafi Hate, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/23/opinion/isis-atrocities-started-with-saudi-support-for-salafi-hate.html?_r=
0 (“Al Qaeda, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, Boko Haram, the Shabab and others are all violent Sunni
Salafi groupings. For five decades, Saudi Arabia has been the official sponsor of Sunni Salafism across the
globe.”).
53 Ryan Mauro, Call in Congress to Sanction Turkey, Qatar for Terror Support, CLARION PROJECT (Dec.
11, 2014), http://www.clarionproject.org/analysis/members-congress-sanction-turkey-qatar-terror-support. See
also Qatar Emir Support for Muslim Brotherhood is a “Duty,” MIDDLE E. MONITOR (Dec. 13, 2013, 3:54
PM), https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/middle-east/9000-qatar-emir-support-for-muslim-brotherhood
-is-a-qdutyq.
54 Chase Carter, The Case for Assad, NAT’L INT. (June 20, 2014), http://nationalinterest.org/feature/thecase-assad-10708.
55 Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Address to the South African Press Club (Oct. 21, 1997). See generally
ALEX BORAINE, A COUNTRY UNMASKED: INSIDE SOUTH AFRICA’S TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
(2000); Alex Boraine, Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa Amnesty: The Price of Peace, in
RETRIBUTION AND REPATRIATION IN THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY 299–316 (John Elster ed., Cambridge
U. Press 2006).
56 See Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 (S. Afr.) (amended 1997).
57 For a textual analysis of the constitution, see generally HEINZ KLUG, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH
AFRICA, A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS (2010).
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actor to admit that it is unwilling to face a Truth and Reconciliation process.
After all, to refuse such a process implicates that the actors themselves realize
that their explanations or confessions are not likely to be met with a
sympathetic response. Their refusal might mean that they know their violent
acts against civilians to fight terrorists will only take them so far when the
consequences of their actions impacted so many innocent civilians and was
applied so indiscriminately as to violate all notions of proportionality and just
war theory. Either they should feel like they can explain their justifications for
the use of force (they were ordered to take their actions by superiors who have
since been granted amnesty, or were so overcome by fear and concern for
themselves and their loved ones that they hated to do what they did, and now
ask for forgiveness), or they will likely have to admit that their acts were raw
exercises of power that disregarded the dignity of the Syrian population, and
put their own needs ahead of the needs of innocent Syrians.
The dilemma Tutu poses between “truth” and “justice” is one that TRCs
have struggled with ever since South Africa. Some have sought justice
following the TRC processes, claiming that individuals did not speak the truth,
or that they did not do so with remorse, and so it was still the purview of the
TRC to recommend subsequent prosecutions.58 Some even sought to use
statements by expatriates, given in confidence, as the grounds for future
prosecutions of individuals for war crimes.59
2. Difficulties with TRCs in Liberia, Rwanda, and Kenya
Yet, despite the apparent success of South Africa’s TRC, subsequent TRC
processes in Liberia, Rwanda, and Kenya have floundered.60 The ability of
prosecutors in these countries to be able to bring evidence against these
defendants has been compromised by the passage of time, the difficulty of
getting witnesses to step forward and testify, and failures of capacity in the
courts.61 In other words the dilemma postulated by Desmond Tutu, that truth
will be sacrificed for justice, seems to continue to be real because the ability to
get justice has been compromised by the atrocities themselves. The dilemma
58 Rosalind Raddatz, Tempering Great Expectations: Peacebuilding and Transitional Justice in Liberia,
in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND PEACEBUILDING ON THE GROUND: VICTIMS AND EX-COMBATANTS 178, 186
(Chandra Lekha Sriram et al. eds., 2013).
59 Id. at 181–88.
60 Id.
61 Id.
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seems to be based in part on the belief that producing evidence of war crimes is
a very difficult and time-consuming process that is likely to produce little in
the way of what would constitute admissible evidence in a court of law.62 The
tough trade between truth and justice thus seems required by the very nature of
the atrocities: that those in power will be able to avoid accountability for what
they did, either because there are so few survivors, or because those surviving
will not be willing or able to come forward to give evidence for what was done
to them.
Still, the example of South Africa suggests that where the pressures for
peace take precedent (such pressures could come from Russia and/or Iran—the
question then becoming would Russia or Iran be willing to grant Assad
asylum?), then those left behind may rather face a TRC process with the
promise of amnesty, than the ICC or some existing Syrian court structure that
will likely be run by opposition judges. Without such pressures, the Syrian
regime will likely insist on some arrangement like that granted to the Egyptian
Supreme Military Council, agreeing only to sit on the sidelines and have the
right to become involved again should it feel threatened, or for the “good of the
Syrians generally.” One option might be to require that the military leadership
submit to some specially designed hybrid military tribunal if they are interested
in seeking to continue in their leadership positions. That way each individual
Syrian would have to decide for themselves whether their continued exercise
of power would be able to withstand the scrutiny of a judicial process.
If one assumes a working Supreme Constitutional Court or Supreme Court
of general jurisdiction sufficiently independent of the executive branch, might
such a body serve as the arbiter of past or ongoing acts against the state and its
citizens?63
The 1973 Constitution followed a coup by Assad’s father, who potentially
controlled a drafting process leading to the guarantees of a Ba’ath (Alawite)
controlled nomination process for Presidency64 and broad emergency powers65

62

Id. at 186.
Choosing this option has the potential of keeping the ICC at bay, under principles of complementarity.
64 According to the Constitution, the President of the Republic is elected for seven years according to the
Christian calendar, beginning at the date of the expiration of the term of the incumbent President.
CONSTITUTION OF SYRIA Mar. 13, 1973. See Phil Sands, Syria’s New Constitution Has Not Weakened Baath
Party’s Grip on Power, NATIONAL (May 1, 2012), http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/syriasnew-constitution-has-not-weakened-baath-partys-grip-on-power#full.
63
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provisions, which his son followed during a discussion for a new Constitution
in 2012.
Each Constitution presents significant challenges for the transition period.
At a substantive level there is the debate between a parliamentary system
described in the 1950 Constitution and the stronger presidential style
governance structure described in the 1973 and 2012 Constitutions.66 The
Constitution of 1950 was replaced, so unless agreed to by the parties, it is later
subject to challenge by anyone who was not a party to the agreement.67
The 2012 Constitution builds on the 1973 Constitution, which provides for
the president to exercise emergency powers, disband the legislature, and
overrule the judiciary should the president determine that it is necessary for the
security of Syria.68 On the other hand, the 2012 Constitution with amendments
might be more palatable to Assad and therefore is something he might agree to
during a transition period until the end of a third term (he was elected in 2000,
2007, and again in 2014). The 2012 Constitution could be amended to allow a
president to only serve three terms, and provide that the term runs from 2014 to
2021, or for another six years. This would allow Assad to be President for the
transition period. Other amendments might include forbidding the president
from declaring emergency powers, submission to the decisions of the
legislature, and the ruling of an independent Supreme Court. If the president
would be granted immunity during the transitional period, and his power
checked by a time limit that he would stay in power, and agree to share power
in the executive structure, Assad might find this an acceptable face-saving
trade-off for peace. The question would be whether Assad would also agree
that others in his regime would have to subject themselves to the workings of
the Constitutional Courts. Would (or could) Assad open the possibility that
security and/or military leaders would have to answer to war crimes committed
against civilians? He might trade his continuation in power for the jurisdiction
of the court over these other decision makers. If it is true that he did not know
that his military leaders were committing war crimes, he might be willing to
65 CARSTEN WIELAND, SYRIA: A DECADE OF LOST CHANCES: REPRESSION AND REVOLUTION FROM
DAMASCUS SPRING TO ARAB SPRING 208–09 (2012). Wieland surmises that Assad’s failure to accept
democratic reforms and his use of emergency powers is best explained by his feeling of isolation due to
accusations of his role in the assassination of Lebanon’s Prime Minister Harari in February of 2012. Id.
66 See SYRIAN CTR. FOR POLITICAL & STRATEGIC STUDIES, THE SYRIAN EXPERT HOUSE, SYRIA
TRANSITION ROADMAP 57, 60 (2013).
67 See id. at 61.
68 WIELAND, supra note 65, at 208–09.
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make the trade.69 If he did know, he is likely to refuse such a trade-off because
some will most likely offer evidence against Assad to explain why they did
what they did. Assuming some agreement to put independent members of the
Syrian community on that court, there is at least a theoretical possibility that
such a court could proceed against these actors and bring them to justice.70
Still, use of the existing legal frameworks presents significant challenges.
Who will sit on such courts? Will these courts have the capacity to try these
individuals for past crimes? In answer to the latter question, new developments
in modern evidence gathering techniques suggest that with some minor support
from the international community, the capacity of the Syrians to try individuals
subjected to the jurisdiction of Syrian courts is not only possible, but likely to
produce both due process for the accused and the evidence necessary to
convict those who committed such atrocities.71 There are significant risks to
the continued peace during the transitional peace process if these national
and/or regional courts refused to prosecute either Assad or his regime
leadership, or prosecute but in the end find no evidence of wrongdoing.
E. Interim Governing Constitution Providing for Both a Formal Structure for
Dealing with Interpretations of the Interim Constitution, and Informal
Mediation Processes Backed by a Hybrid Criminal Process—The Best
Option Where the U.N. is Involved
An interim period that removed the executive power from the president and
put it into the hands of a “Supreme Legislative Council” might comply with
the terms of the Geneva II communiqué,72 and provide a period in which Syria
69 60 Minutes: Syrian President Bashar al-Assad (CBS television broadcast Mar. 29, 2015), http://www.
cbsnews.com/news/syria-president-bashar-al-assad-60-minutes-charlie-rose/. Assad repeats a twisted logic that
he can’t be committing war crimes (use of chemical weapons including most recently chlorine gas and barrel
bombs) against Syrians because they continue to support him. How he knows they continue to support him is
met with his assertions that they do.
70 Eugenio Bulygin, Criminal Prosecutions of Human Rights Violations, YALE L. SCH. SEMINARIO EN
LATINOAMÉRICA DE TEORÎA CONSTITUCIONAL Y POLÍTICA (2001), http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/
Bulygin_Criminal_Prosecutions_of_Human_Rights_Violations.pdf (discussing the transitions from
dictatorship to democracy in Argentina, Chile, and Greece; Argentinian prosecution of military juntas for past
atrocities in the 1970s and 80s suggests that a country’s internal judicial procedures, even if ad hoc, can often
be adequate to the task).
71 See Alex Schank, Sectarianism and Transitional Justice in Syria: Resisting International Trials, 45
GEO. J. INT’L L. 557, 571 (2014).
72 See Final Communique, ACTION GROUP FOR SYRIA (June 30, 2012), http://www.un.org/News/dh/
infocus/Syria/FinalCommuniqueActionGroupforSyria.pdf.
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could transition into a new Constitutional governance structure, selected by the
Syrian people, like that done in 1950. A constituent assembly of some sort
could be organized and divisive issues such as whether the government will be
based on a parliamentary system or provide for an independently elected
president can be postponed until it has had a chance to deliberate on the issues
and reach a consensus. South Africa, again, sets a good example of this option.
In 1994 the opposition party, led by Mandela and the government, represented
by de Klerk, agreed on thirty-two fundamental principles that would apply
during the transition and, importantly, to the new constitution that would
follow free elections.73 In South Africa’s case, these provisions were brought
into force by “interim” amendments to the existing constitution.74 These
arrangements included the requirement of a new Constitutional Court that
would examine any reformulated constitution for compliance with these
principles.75 The new Constitutional Court would then be bound by the thirtytwo fundamental principles as constituting a higher law in order to ensure that
a democratic, non-racial secular government could not be usurped through a
majoritarian legislative enactment.76
An Interim Governing Constitution is “imposed” unilaterally by the parties
to the peace agreement.77 Its legal authority might come in the form of an
“amendment” to the existing Constitution to provide for the interim
Constitution.78 Accompanying the Interim Constitution should be agreements
for the additional safeguarding of human rights and fundamental freedoms, an
independent “judiciary” body, and a neutral political environment in which the
national dialogue would take place.79 Provisions for a democratic electoral
process might be part of this stage of the process with support for multiparty

73

MARAIS & DAVIES, supra note 43, at 8–9.
Mac Maharaj, The ANC and South Africa’s Negotiated Transition to Democracy and Peace, in
RESISTANCE/LIBERATION MOVEMENTS AND TRANSITIONS TO POLITICS 26–29 (Veronique Dudouet & David
Bloomfield eds., 2008).
75 Brice Dickson, Protecting Human Rights Through a Constitutional Court: The Case of South Africa,
66 FORDHAM L. REV. 531, 539–40 (1997).
76 LAURA SEGAL & SHARON CORT, ONE LAW, ONE NATION: THE MAKING OF THE SOUTH AFRICA
CONSTITUTION 119–33 (2011).
77 See generally THE CARTER CENTER, SYRIA: OPTIONS FOR A POLITICAL TRANSITION (2014),
http://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/peace/conflict_resolution/syria-conflict/Options-for-PoliticalTransition-in-Syria-Aug-2014-en.pdf.
78 Id. at 12, 14.
79 Id. at 25.
74
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elections.80 The agreement should also set out a timeframe for the transitional
period, with benchmarks.81
Following its post-election violence in 2007, Kenya enacted a similar
arrangement. The parties agreed to a “power-sharing” agreement, with an
expansion of powers to the Prime Minister, along with increased numbers of
cabinet posts, but instead of establishing its own Constitutional Court in the
interim, referred matters of post-election violence to the ICC.82
Vital to the success of these interim arrangements are the establishment of
oversight mechanisms and a separation of powers structure in order to protect
against a strong leader returning to power. It also protects against a minority
sect that once is in power would seek to override the majority/minority rights
of other sects or religious groups.83 At a minimum, some provision in the
agreement should rule out the use of “emergency” powers by the Executive (or
Supreme Military Council) during the interim period. Zimbabwe is an example
of a cautionary tale in this regard. Following its crisis in 2008, it adopted an
interim agreement on the model of Kenya but without a sufficient mechanism
for oversight during the interim period.84 The President had reluctantly signed
the agreement, and thereafter he did not abide by its terms and principles.85 To
provide against this possibility, interim arrangements might include the
establishment of a Transitional National Assembly and a Transitional Judicial
Council, together providing the checks and balances over the Transitional
Governing Body.

80

Id. at 15.
Id.
82 Text of Power-Sharing Agreement in Kenya, REUTERS (Feb. 28, 2008), http://www.retuers.com/article/
2008/02/28/us-kenya-crisis-text-idUSL2822580120080228. Similar arrangements were used in Papua New
Guinea in the Bougainville Peace Process. See Bougainville Peace Process art. 1, Apr. 9, 2002,
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/bougain_20010830.pdf.
Similar arrangements were also used in Yemen in 2012, but the Yemen interim period has not proved
successful, as the tribal differences have grown violent, leading to resignation of the President of the interim
government. Leela Jacinto, How a ‘peace deal’ Plunged Yemen Deeper into Chaos, FR. 24 (Jan. 23, 2015),
http://www.france24.com/en/20150122-yemen-houthi-peace-deal-president-resigns-shiite/.
83 For example, during the South Africa transitional period, de Klerk agreed to a structure that bound the
military to the President and created a Constitutional Court that would provide the independent interpretation
of the South Africa Constitution, including its enforcement of minority rights. Dickson, supra note 75, at 532.
84 Alexander Noyes, Securing Reform? Power Sharing and Civil-Security Relations in Kenya and
Zimbabwe, 13 AFR. STUD. Q., Winter 2013, at 39.
85 Id. at 34.
81
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How these oversight bodies might be constituted is worth a close look. For
example, one option for Syria is to use transitional oversight bodies like those
used in Cambodia86 and provided for in the Dayton Peace Accords.87 Of
course, these transitional bodies were imposed by the international community
after there had been a forced regime change.88 Still, the various regional
powers might demand a new power-sharing arrangement to end the conflict,
and Syrians themselves could turn to the international community for help.
Each peace agreement (Cambodia and Dayton) included representation from
the international community, from the U.N. Special Representative of the
Secretary-General, in the case of Cambodia, or a “high representative” from
the international community, in the case of Dayton.89 These served as
“guarantors” of the peace agreement.90 A further recent example of the role
that the U.N. can play in investigating and providing proof for war crimes
comes in its investigation into Assad and Hezbollah. The U.N. tried five
Hezbollah members, in absentia, for their killing of former Prime Minister
Rafik Hariri of Lebanon and twenty-one others.91

86 See Cambodia, INT’L CT. FOR TRANSITIONAL J., https://www.ictj.org/our-work/regions-and-countries/
cambodia (last visited Aug. 17, 2015).
87 See Peace Implementation Conference for the Bosnian General Framework Agreement: Conclusions
of the London Meeting, 35 I.L.M. 223 (1996); Elizabeth M. Bruch, Hybrid Courts: Examining Hybridity
Through a Post-Colonial Lens, 28 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1, 10 (2010).

The Human Rights Chamber was created under Annex 6 of the Dayton Peace Agreement to
“assist the Parties in honouring their obligations” to secure the highest level of international
human rights protection for the people of Bosnia. More broadly, it was conceived as an
intentionally hybrid court with the teleology of achieving Europeanized protection of human
rights and the rule of law in the specific context of post-war Bosnia.
Id.

88 Id. at 8; see also David Cohen, “Hybrid” Justice in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and Cambodia:
“Lessons Learned” and Prospects for the Future, 43 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 1 (2007) (evaluating hybrid tribunals
in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and Cambodia).
89 Final Act of the Paris Conference on Cambodia, sec. 2, art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/46/608 (Oct. 30, 1991);
Dayton Peace Agreement, Geneva Annex, Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina art. 8,
§ 3(d), Nov. 30, 1995, UN Doc. A/50/79C.
90 Id.
91 Agreement Between the United Nations and the Lebanese Republic on the Establishment of a Special
Tribunal for Lebanon, U.N.-Leb., Jan. 29, 2007, 2461 U.N.T.S. 280, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1757 (May 30, 2007);
Ronan Bergman, The Hezbollah Connection, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/02/15/magazine/the-hezbollah-connection.html?_r=0. A human rights organization called Witness works
to train journalists to gather evidence that could later be used in criminal prosecutions in areas like Rio, and in
other conflicts around the world. The article also described the work by two engineers from the Medical
College of Wisconsin, Brian Laning and Bonnie Freudinger, who recently won a USAID grant to work on the
International Evidence Locker, a free smartphone app. Photos collected on the app are automatically location,
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Of course, President Assad may have significant objections to giving up
this kind of power during the interim period. Still, the principles for
governance during the interim period might provide sufficient guarantees for
the safety and security of the President himself. In addition, the agreement
should make clear that the oversight body and membership would be neutral
yet principled, ensuring that no side uses force or violence to bring about its
goals. In other words, the principal purpose of the oversight committee would
be to provide a forum for the mediation of disputes between the parties by (1)
insisting on the non-violent and peaceful resolution of disputes, occurring out
of the public glare, and (2) moving the parties along to the end of the transition
period when democratic processes and a new constitution can take over. In
addition, one option that might be used during the interim is a TRC-like
process that is designed for the resolution of disputes involving the leadership
of the military and security forces. This might provide enough “truth” about
what was done by the military during the civil war to help the country move
past the war and start to take constructive actions toward a peaceful future.
Whatever the dispute resolution system chosen by the Syrians for disputes
between the Syrian leadership and military leadership, there yet remains to be
determined what dispute resolution systems during the interim period should
be employed at the local levels. What will be the processes that will deal with
Syrians who engaged on behalf of opposition groups, or DASH, or ISIS, and
remain in Syria? In addition, the interim period will need to provide a system
for handling disputes that will arise between those who stayed and those who
left during the civil war, and to hold accountable any who engage in violence
during the interim period.
Syrians who committed atrocities on behalf of opposition groups or who
engaged in murder, extortion, and kidnapping for criminal gain may remain in
these communities post-conflict. The capacity of Syrian courts to handle these
disputes will likely need to wait until after a new constitution has been enacted
and judges can be appointed. In the meantime Syria may choose to empower
and support its local assemblies, Shari’a courts, councils, and governing bodies
in handling disputes that occur in those communities. Civil service
organizations should ready an effort to train and support these local bodies in
date, and time-stamped, encrypted and securely sent to two separate protected servers. They can also be
submitted anonymously. Matthew Shaer, The Media Doesn’t Care What Happens Here: Can Amateur
Journalism Bring Justice to Rio’s Favelas?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/
02/22/magazine/the-media-doesnt-care-what-happens-here.html.
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mediated solutions, if possible, to the acts committed during the war. One
option is to use Rwanda-style Abunzi proceedings that use community
standards for determining the facts, use sanctions that emphasize compensation
over retribution, use community rituals that may produce meaningful truth
telling, and open the possibility of victim forgiveness.92
Syria might adopt a dispute resolution process similar to that used in Iraq in
the aftermath of the war removing Saddam Hussein to deal with real property
disputes that arose between those who stayed and those who left during the
war.93 A United States Agency for International Development (USAID)backed U.N. Commission called the Committee for the Resolution of Real
Property Disputes (CRRPD) was set up to mediate such disputes.94 The
Commission trained Iraqis to mediate these disputes with a goal of keeping the
parties from resorting to violence.95 The program has since been integrated into
Iraqi governance structures as the Iraqi Real Property Commission.96 It gives
the right to compensation from the Iraqi government to anyone displaced by a
returning Iraqi.97 By all reports it has resolved most of the real property
disputes without the parties ever resorting to violence.98
Finally, the interim period might also provide for a back-up dispute
resolution system, should the informal processes not provide adequate
resolution of disputes on a local level. A hybrid body might be employed for
cases that need the oversight of an appellate review process. This second
“backup” judicial body could operate like the old circuit courts, where it
travels from place to place to place to hold proceedings on the most egregious
cases. The body could be made up of Syrian judges, supported by international
prosecutors and defense counsel, ready to step in should the dispute not be
92 See Abunzi, REPUBLIC RWANDA MINISTRY JUST., http://www.minijust.gov.rw/services/abunzi (last
visited Aug. 26, 2015).
93 Statute of the Commission for the Resolution of Real Property Disputes No. 2 of 2006 (Iraq),
http://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/_assets/files/field_protection_clusters/Iraq/files/Iraq_PC_Statute_Com
mission_Property_Resolution_2006_EN.pdf.
94 Id.
95 Peter Van der Auweraert, Senior Legal Officer, Reparations Programmes Unit, Int’l Org. for
Migration, Presentation at U.S. Dep’t of State Symposium on Post Conflict Restitution: Property Restitution in
Iraq (Sept. 6-7, 2007), http://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/organization/98032.pdf.
96 Statute of the Commission for the Resolution of Real Property Disputes, supra note 93.
97 Id.
98 Peter Van der Auweraert, Iraq Updates its Approach to Former Regime-Related Land and Property
Claims, TERRE NULLIUS (Mar. 11, 2010), https://terra0nullius.wordpress.com/2010/03/11/iraq-updates-itsapproach-to-former-regime-related-land-and-property-claims/.
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resolved to the satisfaction of the parties, to investigate the dispute using
international standards of evidence gathering, and to ensure due process was
provided to the accused.
In the end, this two-tiered system of dispute resolution best balances the
need for peace against Syrian insistence on fighting impunity for those who
committed crimes against civilians. Especially when backed by the ability of
international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to provide support to
both formal and informal dispute resolution processes, the transitional
government can both continue to enforce the end of violent conflict and
manage a dispute resolution process out of the public eye until the new
governance structure is enacted.
II. CONFLICT MAPPING OF SOCIAL MEDIA AND ITS IMPACT ON DISPUTE
RESOLUTION DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD
Since the start of the Syrian conflict, both victims and perpetrators of war
crimes have been prolific in their use of video postings on YouTube,
Facebook, MySpace and Twitter.99 In addition, Syrians have sent a large
number of videos as attachments in emails to friends and acquaintances.100
These videos depict not only atrocities committed against Syrians by the
government, but also promote various armed group activities and recruitment
of new members.101 As we have seen in Part I, the evidence provided through
public source social media has changed the equation between truth and justice
that may exit in any transition period following the Syrian civil war.102 In
particular, video evidence collected by NGOs like Human Rights Watch
(HRW), the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW),
and other NGOs with conflict mapping projects raises important implications
for the transition options discussed above.103 Proof might already exist that the

99 See generally MARC LYNCH, DEEN FREELON & SEAN ADAY, U.S. INST. PEACE, BLOGS AND BULLETS
III: SYRIA’S SOCIALLY MEDIATED CIVIL WAR 7 (2014), http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW91-Syrias%
20Socially%20Mediated%20Civil%20War.pdf. Cf. Lauren Kirkwood, Study Finds Bias in Internet Postings
About Syria’s Civil War, MCCLATCHY DC (Feb. 24, 2014), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/
world/middle-east/article24764167.html.
100 LYNCH, FREELON & ADAY, supra note 99, at 14.
101 Id. at 6.
102 See supra Part I.
103 See Syria: Strong Evidence Government Used Chemicals as a Weapon: Civilian Casualties in Barrel
Bomb Attacks on 3 Towns, HUM. RTS. WATCH (May 13, 2014), http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/13/syria-
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Assad government used chemical weapons and barrel bombs, and killed
civilians indiscriminately during the war. Similarly, what was done by ISIS, or
by various opposition groups, might also be sufficiently documented to prove
that members of these groups committed war crimes. As a result of this social
media evidence, the truth of what has been done and by whom is known even
before a peace agreement is reached.
Why a particular bombing, beheading, use of chemical weapons, or other
indiscriminate killing was committed may be in doubt, but these matters are
subject to more discrete items of proof. If the person involved was ordered to
commit a criminal act, there should be evidence of such an order. If President
Assad denies knowing about what was done, he may face a burden in court of
presenting evidence of what he did to remove those who committed such acts
from their leadership positions, or why he did not investigate what was done
and by whom.104 At a minimum such failure may subject the leader to criminal
responsibility.105 In any event, a decision to give amnesty to suspected war
criminals in Syria in advance of these individuals agreeing to end the violence
and stop fighting should not require the same blind trade between truth and
justice that may have been required to end past conflicts.
The conflict mapping projects, in some respects, intensify the difficulties
for the peacemakers in brokering a peace with known war criminals. Now the
calculation is the hard pragmatic choice between continued fighting and loss of
future lives. To the extent that such a choice has implications for the victims of
these atrocities, it is likely not within the authority of the peacemakers to make
these difficult assessments or trade-offs by themselves. For lasting peace some
provision needs to be made to hold those who did these acts accountable. As I
have argued elsewhere, in order for amnesty and forgiveness to be granted in
the peace agreement, the victims must know what they are forgiving, and then

strong-evidence-government-used-chemicals-weapon; ORGANISATION FOR PROHIBITION CHEMICAL WEAPONS,
http://www.opcw.org/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2015).
104 Kai Ambos, General Principles of International Criminal Law, 21: Superior Responsibility, in THE
ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 823, 832 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002);
GUÉNAËL METTRAUX, THE LAW OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY 24 (2009). The ICC uses the doctrine of
command or superior responsibility to provide it with proof of intent necessary to convict an individual for war
crimes. If a leader argues he did not know war crimes had been committed, then once having learned, what
steps did the leader take to remove the individual from power.
105 Ambos, supra note 104, at 833.
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be the ones to grant the forgiveness.106 Without their input, the agreement may
only delay questions of retribution, reconciliation or forgiveness.107
One option for peacemakers is to put the choice to the individuals seeking
amnesty of whether they will submit their actions to an impartial tribunal, or
whether they will instead leave the jurisdiction of the Syrian courts and the
ICC as a condition of peace. Otherwise, the leadership of the parties might be
given the option of submitting to the processes of a TRC or the local tribunal
(like the Abunzi-like tribunals used in Rwanda),108 to work out reconciliation
between those who committed the atrocities and their victims and the victim’s
families.
In setting up these various options for dispute resolution during the
transitional period, the U.N. or an international NGO (like HRW and/or other
human rights organizations that are not intimately involved in the peace
process)109 may now provide a unique supporting role in the work of both the
formal court proceedings and the informal TRC’s or local mediation efforts.
They can help provide the supporting evidence for these alternative forums to
help make the determination necessary and appropriate to each alternative: to
make findings of fact of what happened during any alleged war crime, and help
the parties assess the nature of the act committed, in order for the victims to
make meaningful determinations of whether forgiveness is in the offing.
First, we will look at how admissible proof that can connect war criminals
with their murders and with the victims of their crimes may change the peacemaking equation in dealing with the perpetrators of atrocities in Syria. We will
look at admissibility standards in the U.S., the ICC, and in criminal
prosecutions under present Syrian law to see what challenges will likely come
from the use of social media evidence. Next, we will look at how such
evidence might also be used in TRC or local community mediation settings

106

Paul J. Zwier, History, Creative Imagination, and Forgiveness in Mediation on an International Stage:
Practical Lessons from Paul Ricoeur’s Hermeneutics, 30 J.L. & RELIGION 194, 195 (2015).
107 Kristin C. Doughty, Contesting Community: Legalized Reconciliation Efforts in the Aftermath of
Genocide in Rwanda 337–38 (May 16, 2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania) (on
file with the Penn Libraries, University of Pennsylvania).
108 See Abunzi, supra note 92.
109 Note that some NGOs like The Carter Center refuse to use their conflict mapping for other than
humanitarian purposes, in that it could potentially compromise its neutrality in negotiations for peace, if it
were seen to be gathering evidence against the parties.
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that might create a greater likelihood that meaningful reconciliation will take
place.
A. Use of Social Media Videos and Proof in Formal Judicial Proceedings
Consider evidence recently collected by HRW concerning the Syrian
government’s use of barrel bombs.110 This evidence strongly suggests that
Syrian government helicopters dropped barrel bombs embedded with cylinders
of chlorine gas on three towns in Northern Syria in mid-April 2014.111 The
question is whether such evidence would be admissible, if provided to a
judicial body like the ICC or a western style court. Allegations that the Syrian
military used an industrial chemical as a weapon, an act banned by the
international treaty prohibiting chemical weapons,112 would be important in
proving a case against Assad, or his military leaders, of committing war
crimes. Syria signed on to the international treaty in October 2013,113 so it
would be difficult to deny that it knew such acts were criminal. What would
110 See Syria: Strong Evidence Government Used Chemicals as a Weapon, HUM. RTS. WATCH (May 13,
2014), http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/13/syria-strong-evidence-government-used-chemicals-weapon. Improvised
barrel bombs “are typically constructed from large oil drums, various types of metal cylinders, and water tanks
filled with explosives and scrap metal to enhance fragmentation, which are then dropped from a helicopter.
The heat from the explosion of the barrel bomb would destroy much of the chlorine and any remaining gas
would be dispersed in the air by the explosion so the concentration of chlorine would quickly drop to nonlethal levels.” Id.
111 Id. Much of the evidence gathered concerning the use of chemical weapons was through interviews of
OPCW and HRW soon after the attacks. HRW’s deputy director of the Middle East and North Africa went into
Syria and interviewed a number of witnesses, concluding that Syria had used chlorine gas as a weapon and had
targeted civilians. It recommended that the U.N. Security Council refer the situation in Syria to the ICC. The
pictures and video evidence can help expose the true nature of Assad’s denial that barrel bombs were used. Id.
But see Syria Conflict: BBC Exclusive Interview with President Bashar al-Assad, BBC (Feb. 10, 2015, 5:57
AM), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-31327153. In this interview, President Assad denied that
Syria was using barrel bombs or chlorine gas in their war against the opposition. During the BBC interview,
Assad seems to be denying that the Syrian government was engaged in the use of barrel bombs, or chlorine
gas, or at least that he doesn’t know that they are using barrel bombs or chlorine gas. Though his argument is a
little suspect—that he has no reason to use these types of weapons against Syrian civilians, so therefore he
isn’t using them. Assad does not say that he has investigated their use, and claims he directed the army not to
use these types of weapons. Presumably he could have offered his willingness to investigate, as that is the
process he went through in helping the U.N. dispose of other chemical weapons. He does not offer a
willingness to investigate whether his military is engaged in the use of barrel bombs or chlorine gas.
112 See Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical
Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for signature Sept. 3, 1992, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45 (entered into force
Apr. 29, 1997).
113 Syria Officially Joins the UN Chemical Weapons Convention, HINDU (Oct. 14, 2013, 3:11 PM),
http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/syria-officially-joins-un-chemical-weapons-convention/
article5233423.ece.

ZWIER GALLEYSPROOFS2

196

12/14/2015 11:03 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

remain for a prosecutor would be to prove whether a particular military leader,
or President Assad, knew the chlorine gas was being used, or knew that barrel
bombs were being dropped on civilians.
The HRW and OPCW proof is just a small part of the evidence the NGO
community has gathered during the Syrian conflict. For example, an
organization at Stanford University has taken up the task of mapping militant
organizations, including ISIS.114 Using special mapping techniques over time it
has been able to show the growth of various militant groups and map their
activities.115
In addition, consider what might be accomplished through a Conflict
Mapping Project run by the U.N. to support later prosecutions regarding the
treatment of women and children,116 and of the parties for war crimes, or assist
in any process that would attempt to bring reconciliation between the parties
and victims. If the U.N. is able to adequately segregate its mapping projects
from it peacemaking efforts, it might be able to support post-conflict transition
periods, depending on what type of transition is negotiated. Where the peace
agreement asks for involvement of the ICC, it can use the information it gained
as evidence, and where the peace agreement will use a TRC or other informal
reconciliation process, it can use the data to support more meaningful
confessions and possibilities for forgiveness.
Most of the data used in conflict mapping comes from public-source social
media.117 There are some reports that over 700,000 videos have been posted by
Syrians on YouTube since the conflict began in 2011.118 By coding and
searching these videos, a map of the conflict can produce significant results.

114 Mapping Militant Organizations, STAN. U., http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin
(last visited Aug. 26, 2015).
115 See id.
116 See generally MADRE ET AL., SEEKING ACCOUNTABILITY AND DEMANDING CHANGE: A REPORT ON
WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN SYRIA BEFORE AND DURING THE CONFLICT (2014), http://www.law.
cuny.edu/academics/clinics/iwhr/publications/Seeking-Accountability-and-Demanding-Change-A-Report-onWomens-Human-Rights-Violations-in-Syria-Before-and-During-the-Conflict.pdf.
117 Federico Guerrini, How Researchers Use Social Media to Map the Conflict in Syria, FORBES (Apr. 15,
2014, 10:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/federicoguerrini/2014/04/15/how-researchers-use-socialmedia-to-map-armed-forces-in-syria/print/.
118 Palanir Technologies provides technologies to map data over time in a variety of settings. See Mapping
the Syrian Crisis with the Carter Center, PALANTIR: PALANTIR BLOG (June 5, 2014), https://www.palantir.
com/2014/06/mapping-the-syrian-crisis-with-the-carter-center/.
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Such a project would be able to coordinate videos with other reports of
events at certain places and locations in Syria and map those reports with the
information it is coding from the videos. Take, for example, a news report on
Al Jazeera News, that ISIS had beheaded a Shia Muslim, simply for being a
Shia.119 ISIS seemed bent on provoking Shias in Syria into an all-out civil
war.120 A mapping of the conflict would allow the mapper to identify the place
Al Jazeera reported as where the beheading took place as one in which ISIS
was involved. It could confirm that another related insurgent group had posted
a video of a clash where the Shia was said to have been beheaded.121 It could
then confirm that the video of the place where the clash occurred is consistent
with the video of the beheaded body of a young Arab. The clash between the
related ISIS group is easily identified by referring to that group’s promotional
video as being against a predominately Shia insurgent group. It seemed to
corroborate that ISIS is taking responsibility for a real event—a war crime. An
event that not only violates humanitarian law, but also, at least for some
Muslims, is a misinterpretation of the meaning of “jihad” and violates seventyfive Islamic verses from the Koran, attributed to the Prophet himself, which
forbid such acts against minority groups.122
In 2011, a number of research organizations123 noticed that there were an
enormous number of YouTube videos that were being posted by various
groups that seemed to be documenting acts of violence in Syria and started
gathering social media postings on the conflict. At first, most were taken from
hand-held devices like cell phones; the videos were poor quality and the
camera moved and jerked throughout the video.124 The sound quality was also
119 See Twitter Users Call for #ISISMediaBlackout Following Purported Beheading of US Journalist, AL
JAZEERA (Aug. 20, 2014), http://stream.aljazeera.com/story/201408201239-0024088 [hereinafter Twitter
Users Call for #ISISMediaBlackout].
120 Ahmed Rashid, ISIS: What the US Doesn’t Understand, NYR DAILY (Dec. 2, 2014, 12:22 PM),
http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2014/dec/02/isis-what-us-doesnt-understand/.
121 Twitter Users Call for #ISISMediaBlackout, supra note 119.
122 But see Robert Spencer, Muslim Cleric Justifies Islamic State Beheadings, JIHAD WATCH (Aug. 25,
2015, 6:00 PM), http://www.jihadwatch.org/2014/08/muslim-cleric-justifies-islamic-state-beheadings-islam-isa-religion-of-beheading (noting the Prophet spoke directly against the killing of minority religious groups in
negotiating the rights of passage of Muslims to pilgrimage to Mecca).
123 See, e.g., POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY NOW, http://www.polgeonow.com (last visited Aug. 26, 2015).
124 John Hall, ISIS Mass Beheading Video Took up to Six HOURS to Film and Cost $200,000: Forensic
Analysis of Syrian Soldier Murders Reveals Clues that Could Help Nail Jihadi John, DAILY M AIL (Dec. 8,
2014, 1:45 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2865745/Has-EXACT-location-infamous-ISISbeheading-video-pinpointed-Forensic-analysis-filmed-Syrian-soldier-murders-breaks-filmed-long-took-costmake.html#ixzz3YKpGgHDR.
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quite bad. Later in the conflict, there were more professionally shot videos
filled with high quality sound and special effects.125 In fact, there were
approximately 600 videos posted per day between 2013 and 2014 trying to
show the world what was happening in Syria.126 Concerned that many of the
videos were from civilians trying to get the world to know what was
happening, some NGOs hired staff of young Arab-speaking researchers to code
the videos according to a number of criteria, including type of group; its
mission, place, time and date; weapons shown; and various information about
victims.127 They also did the same with “formation” videos posted by different
rebel groups, which were trying to recruit disaffected Arabs, and so were
claiming responsibility for events that they may or may not have actually
participated in.128
The problem conflict mappers recognized early on was how it might use
these videos to help map the conflict, and thereby provide information to the
world, and to humanitarian groups about what was going on in Syria. How
would mappers go about verifying and authenticating the information in these
videos in order to help humanitarian groups determine who should receive
funding and help, and who was likely a terrorist group? Of course, one way is
to use a mindset of a prosecutor and set out to code the videos according to
time and place whether they showed a clash (violence), force on force,
chemical weapons, shelling, improvised explosive devices, bombings, aircraft
or instances of crime, and killings. An investigator could also code the videos
according to whether the videos were of civilians, or of military, the uniforms
worn (deserters from the Syrian army?), the weapons they carried, their
politics, the symbols they used to identify their group, and the narration that
accompanied the video regarding why the group had formed. The higher
number of code factors, the more one can use mapping techniques to explore
125 Id. The Carter Center’s conflict mapping project mapped some videos that were documented to have
been shot and posted around the time that Saudi television was interviewing members of the insurgent group.
Their appearance looks like the television studio not only did the news interview, it also then shot a
promotional video for the group. These promotional videos apparently used the same kinds of special effects in
their new casts, as was used in the video.
126 Jennifer Elias, Inside the Data Science That's Shining New Light on Syria's Civil War, CO.LABS (July
28, 2014), http://www.fastcolabs.com/3033609/inside-the-data-science-thats-shining-new-light-on-syrias-civilwar.
127 See P UB . I NT ’L L AW & P OL’Y G RP ., MAPPING ACCOUNTABILITY EFFORTS IN SYRIA 4–5 (2013),
http://www.dchrs.org/english/File/Reports/mapping-accountability-efforts-in-syria.pdf.
128 See Elias, supra note 126. See also CARTER CTR., SYRIA COUNTRYWIDE CONFLICT REPORT #3, at 11–
18 (2014), http://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/peace/conflict_resolution/syria-conflict/Nationwide
Update_march-14-2014.pdf [hereinafter CONFLICT REPORT #3].
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various relationships between these factors. One mapper has already recorded
the existence of close to 6,000 different groups that have formed since the start
of the civil war.129 A conflict mapper could then map the rise and fall, and/or
consolidation of many of these groups until the present.130
Other conflict mappers could then search news stories and data gathered by
activist human rights organizations, as well as Facebook postings and Twitter
accounts to attempt to corroborate and authenticate what they see on the
videos. They could also map the conflict by coordinating what they see on
video with the movement of refugees. These groups might also enlist the help
of a computer software maker, like Palantir, Inc., to help it see the relationships
between events, times, and places in the videos of a particular group or groups
it is tracking. Palantir’s involvement has been crucial in helping The Carter
Center see various relationships between the groups and data that was being
produced for their ability to give advice for humanitarian purposes.131

Conflict Map of Territory Held.

132

129 CARTER CTR., SYRIA COUNTRYWIDE CONFLICT REPORT #4, at 11 (2014), http://www.cartercenter.org/
resources/pdfs/peace/conflict_resolution/syria-conflict/NationwideUpdate-Sept-18-2014.pdf [hereinafter CONFLICT
REPORT #4].
130 Id. For example, The Carter Center can still identify close to 1,000 groups that are active in the
conflict, roughly grouped according to five different major groups. See id.
131 See, e.g., Mapping Militant Organizations, supra note 114. See also CONFLICT REPORT #4, supra note
129, at 3.
132 CONFLICT REPORT #3, supra note 128, at 9.
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Much of what has been collected would be admissible in court. To be
admitted into evidence, such materials must be properly authenticated in a
courtroom proceeding by the fundamentals of due process.134 The mapping
project has included the gathering of sufficient evidence to support a finding
that the particular videos are authentic.135
A conflict mapper can potentially help authenticate the videos by providing
evidence to identify and locate the witness who took the video, so long as that

133

CONFLICT REPORT #3, supra note 128, at 12.
See e.g., FED. R. EVID. 901(a) (requires laying a foundation of “evidence sufficient to support a finding
that the matter in question is what its proponent claims”). FED. R. EVID. 901(b) (provides an illustrative list of
methods by which evidence can be authenticated).
135 See FED. R. EVID. 901(a) (“To satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of
evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the
proponent claims it to be.”). Videos could be authenticated as a process or system. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(9)
(“Process or system. Evidence describing a process or system used to produce a result and showing that the
process or system produces an accurate result.”). See also FED. R. EVID. 1001(a)–(b); FED. R. EVID. 1001(c)
(provisions for using writings, recordings, and photographs); FED. R. EVID. 1001(d) (noting that an “original”
of a writing or recording is “the writing or recording itself or any counterpart intended to have the same effect
by a person who executed or issued it”; an “original” of a photograph includes the negative or any print
therefrom; if data is stored in a computer or similar device, “any printout—or other output readable by sight,”
that is shown to reflect the data accurately, is an “original.”); FED. R. EVID. 1001(e) (“A duplicate means a
counterpart produced by a mechanical, photographic, chemical, electronic, or other equivalent process or
technique that accurately reproduces the original.”).
134
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witness is also able to testify that the video looks like what they observed. That
is the method used by HRW. On the other hand, taking the witness’s statement
may be effective for confirming the authentication of the video by HRW, but
this is not sufficient authentication later in a court, unless that witness is also
produced to authenticate the evidence. The ICC may authenticate the video
based on the testimony of unavailable witnesses, but recognizes that such
evidence is less reliable, and so a court may give the video evidence less
weight.136 Where, instead, the witness is not produced, or where the video is
not posted by the person who took it, then the proponent supports the
reliability of the evidence using other evidence to verify the posting.137 Of
course, in the great majority of cases either the eyewitness of what was taken
on the video or the poster of the video may not be able to be located. This is
not fatal to the eventual admissibility of the video in that the NGO conflict
mapping project designed to collect such evidence would most likely also
gather the circumstantial evidence necessary that will likely still authenticate it
as evidence.138
When a witness is unavailable or uncooperative, proving that social media
content was indeed authored by the user can be a slightly more complicated
task. Due process, however, provides that circumstantial evidence, including
“appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive

136 See generally Michael P. Scharf, Humanitarian Law-1949 Geneva Conventions-Grave Breaches-Role
of Serbia in Conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 91 A M . J. I NT ’L L. 718, 718–21 (1997); ICTY R. P. & Evid.
92, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 44 (Feb. 11, 1994) (as amended Dec. 10, 2009).
137 Social media sites are dynamic, complex, and may be unfamiliar to many judges. Testimony about
how user profiles are created, security procedures, privacy settings, metadata, and general operation may help
courts to determine whether a satisfactory foundation for authenticity has been laid. Furthermore, courts have
raised legitimate concerns that social networking accounts may be hacked, fictitious accounts created, and
accounts left open and unattended. Testimony thus should address those concerns and also explain the degree
to which the social media in question may have been vulnerable to manipulation. These considerations are
important both for proffering evidence and for challenging its admissibility. Federal Rule of Evidence
901(b)(1) allows for authentication through testimony from a witness with knowledge that a matter is what it is
claimed to be. Most straightforwardly, the person who created the evidence can testify to authenticate it.
Testimony also may be provided by a witness who has personal knowledge of how the social media
information is typically generated. In such a case, the authenticating witness must provide “factual specificity
about the process by which the electronically stored information is created, acquired, maintained, and
preserved without alteration or change, or the process by which it is produced if the result of a system or
process that does so.” Lorraine v. Market Am. Ins., 241 F.R.D. 534, 555–56 (D. Md. 2007). The social media
websites themselves, law review articles, and experts can all provide this type of information.
138 Witnesses may be fearful to come forward because of retribution by those depicted in the video. See
SYRIA JUST. & ACCOUNTABILITY CTR., MAPPING ACCOUNTABILITY EFFORTS IN SYRIA (2013), http://www.
dchrs.org/english/File/Reports/mapping-accountability-efforts-in-syria.pdf.
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characteristics of the item, taken together with all the circumstances,” can help
to authenticate evidence.139 Thus, many paths to authentication exist, subject to
the type of evidence in question.140
Take, for example, a promotional video posted by ISIS that shows a
beheading. First, ISIS’s video posting is often done on a Twitter or Facebook
page. Social networking sites can include a wealth of information, such as
profile pages, posts, photographs, and video, as well as several types of
metadata, some of which are not publicly visible.141 Different types of social
media evidence will require different indicia of reliability. For example, profile
pages and posts may require sufficiently distinctive data, such as references
about which only the author would have known.142

139
140

FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(4).
Christopher Boehning & Daniel J. Toal, Authenticating Social Media Evidence, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 2012,

at 248.
Social media sites are dynamic, complex, and may be unfamiliar to many judges. Testimony
about how user profiles are created, security procedures, privacy settings, metadata, and general
operation may help courts to determine whether a satisfactory foundation for authenticity has
been laid. Furthermore, courts have raised legitimate concerns that social networking accounts
may be hacked, fictitious accounts created, and accounts left open and unattended. Testimony
thus should address those concerns and also explain the degree to which the social media in
question may have been vulnerable to manipulation. These considerations are important both for
proffering evidence and for challenging its admissibility. Rule 901(b) (1) allows for
authentication through testimony from a witness with knowledge that a matter is what it is
claimed to be. Most straightforwardly, the person who created the evidence can testify to
authenticate it. Testimony also may be provided by a witness who has personal knowledge of
how the social media information is typically generated. In such a case, the authenticating
witness must provide “factual specificity about the process by which the electronically stored
information is created, acquired, maintained, and preserved without alteration or change, or the
process by which it is produced if the result of a system or process that does so.” The social
media websites themselves, law review articles, and experts can all provide this type of
information.
Id.
141 See id.; Key Facebook Metadata Fields Lawyers and eDiscovery Professionals Need to be Aware of,
NEXT GEN EDISCOVERY LAW & TECH BLOG (Oct. 11, 2011, 10:06 AM), http://blog.x1discovery.com/2011/10/
11/key-facebook-metadata-fields-lawyers-and-ediscovery-professionals-need-to-be-aware-of/ [hereinafter Key
Facebook Metadata Fields].
142 Relevant factors include whether the person to whom the proponent of the exhibit wishes to attribute
the printout has adopted the username shown on the profile page; whether the person has shared his or her
social media password with other people; whether there is a photograph on the person’s or entity’s profile page
that identifies the person to whom the proponent wishes to attribute the posting; and whether there is personal
information on the profile page, such as a birthday, unique name, or other pedigree information that
corresponds to known information for the person to whom the proponent wishes to attribute the posting.
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Circumstantial evidence visible on the social media site, if it provides
enough content and context, also may be sufficient for authentication. This
could include, for example, a combination of photographs, video, comments,
email addresses, and posting dates. Related data from other sources also may
provide context to aid authentication, including email notifications of posting
activity, and computer and account usage logs. Metadata, such as location, user
identification numbers, IP addresses, and when messages were created or
revised can provide context as well.143
What would happen if the video has been taken down, or there is evidence
that it has been obscured in an attempt to hide the identity of the original taker
of the video?144 Obviously, there are good reasons why victims may want to
obscure their identity when initially posting the video. They may worry that the
regime may itself be looking for evidence of victims so as to intimidate or
remove them from being able to bring evidence against them. So, how could
such videos be authenticated? Again, the primary tools for authentication are
the self-authenticating nature of the videos (that barrel bombs look like those
in the photo, and chemical plumes look like the ones shown in the video), and
then corroboration by other circumstantial evidence (serial numbers on the
bomb can be traced to bombs sold by a known arms dealer to the Syrian
government before the incident where they were used).
On the other hand, a tech savvy criminal defense lawyer would advise that
any video taken by an accused be taken down. Any video a prosecutor
produces for admission a lawyer may thereafter attack by suggesting
challenges to its authentication. The defendant might show how that video can
be altered and edited since it has been posted, or, additionally, at the time of its
posting. Application software, for example, can alter the metadata that
accompanies any video posted on YouTube from its very beginning posting.
The metadata can put a false time, place, and date simply by programming the
camera to post the wrong information when first posted.145 Other applications

143

See Boehning & Toal, supra note 140.
See, e.g., Umberto Bacchi, Isis: French Jihadist Mickael Dos Santos ‘Denies Appearing in Beheading
Video,’ INT’L BUS. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/isis-french-jihadist-mickael-dos-santosdenies-appearing-beheading-video-1475833.
145 See, e.g., ObscuraCam: Secure Smart Camera, GUARDIAN PROJECT, https://guardianproject.info/apps/
obscuracam/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2015).
144
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can be shown to add or remove images in a video by editing out or adding in
other pictures.146
Circumstantial evidence can help in this regard. Expert testimony that
examines the initial downloaded file may provide evidence that no such editing
or obscuring software was evidenced in the original posting. The absence of
certain metadata tags can prove the negative, that these videos were not
altered.147
Again, while other circumstantial evidence can likely be offered to
overcome these challenges, an archivist interested in authenticating the video
offered at a dispute resolution hearing will do their best to download the
original video when they first put it in their archives.148 The archivist may use
software such as Checksum,149 which gives a proponent of the evidence an
ability to provide a mathematical code when they initially download the file, to
then show the one they are offering is the same as that downloaded one. If the
proponent can show that the download occurs before the defendant had a
chance to remove or alter the file, or someone else may have had the chance to
do so, then the proponent has a better case for authentication.
Social media evidence is most likely to be admitted at trial when it is
obtained through formal discovery requests made to the opponent or accused
subject to a lawful search. Where such a process is impossible, thoroughly
documenting and verifying the process and results of social media data
collection can help the evidence withstand authentication challenges.150 The
simplest method is to capture and preserve static images taken from social
media sites. In addition, downloading the video to one’s own system, and then
documenting the download, can also be an important way to preserve the
video. These images may be difficult to authenticate without testimony based
on personal knowledge.151 A conflict mapper should create a system for its
downloading that will establish the use of a “custodian of records” that would
be able to lay the foundation that the video is authentic.

146

Id.
See Key Facebook Metadata Fields, supra note 141.
148 Podcasts and Downloadable Videos, INTERACTIVE ARCHIVIST, http://interactivearchivist.archivists.
org/technologies/podcasts/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2015) (describing methods of downloading original videos).
149 SOURCEFORGE, http://checksumchecker.sourceforge.net/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2015).
150 See Boehning & Toal, supra note 140; supra note 132 and accompanying map.
151 Key Facebook Metadata Fields, supra note 141.
147

ZWIER GALLEYSPROOFS2

2015]

SOCIAL MEDIA AND CONFLICT MAPPING IN SYRIA

12/14/2015 11:03 AM

205

Collecting metadata for use at trial may require specialized software.
Printouts, screen captures, and video saves and most archive tools will not
provide all of the available metadata.152 Working with Google, a conflict
mapper might develop the tools to download and collect content to better
capture and preserve the unique metadata fields associated with social
media.153
Despite altruistic intentions, NGOs must be careful of privacy and other
ethical concerns when collecting information from social networks.154
Essentially, NGO researchers should adopt best practices approaches in their
collection of videos, perhaps acting like attorneys and taking care to avoid
conduct that could be considered “pretexting” or deceptive as proscribed by
court rules of professional conduct.155
Beyond the unique issues of authentication and ethics, social media
evidence also must clear evidentiary hurdles such as relevance and hearsay.
“Such issues, however, are generally more susceptible to traditional reasoning
and evidentiary standards.”156 In fact, electronic communications, such as
emails, “lend themselves to novel uses of hearsay exceptions.”157 Hearsay is an
out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.158
Exceptions include present sense impressions, excited utterances, and thenexisting mental, emotional, or physical conditions, for example.159 Facebook
status updates, public posts, chat transcripts, Tweets, and more lend themselves
well to such exceptions. Litigators who keep these exceptions in mind may be
able to find creative ways to overcome the hearsay hurdle to admissibility.
It is important to note, as a legal matter, that little help is likely to come
from a prosecutor’s subpoenaing of third party vendors like Google and
152

See id.
Google has the technology to help a mapper establish authenticity by, for example, generating hash
values (unique document identifiers) for collected social media items and automatically creating collection
logs. See generally Download Your Data, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/3024190?hl=
en (last visited Sept. 2, 2015).
154 Boehning & Toal, supra note 140, at 248.
155 This guidance provided by state bar associations is not binding, but does suggest best practices that
will help attorneys avoid ethical pitfalls that may taint evidence and destroy admissibility. See generally
MODEL RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT R. 7.1 (1983).
156 Boehning & Toal, supra note 140.
157 Id.
158 FED. R. EVID. § 801(c).
159 FED. R. EVID. § 803(1)–(3).
153
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others.160 While the discoverability analysis is a product of the common law,
there is at least one statute relevant to the discussion. In the U.S., the Stored
Communications Act (SCA) limits the ability of Internet-service providers to
voluntarily disclose information about their customers and subscribers.161
Although providers may disclose electronic communications with the consent
of the subscriber, the SCA does not contain an exception for disclosure
pursuant to civil discovery subpoena.162 The application of the SCA to
discovery of communications stored on social-networking sites has produced
mixed results.163
Providers, including Facebook, take the position that the SCA prohibits
them from disclosing social media contents, even by subpoena. Facebook’s
website says that “[f]ederal law does not allow private parties to obtain account
contents (ex: messages, Timeline posts, photos), using subpoenas.”164
Specifically, the SCA, 18 U.S.C. § 2701, prohibits Facebook from disclosing
the contents of an account to any non-governmental entity pursuant to a
subpoena or court order.165
The SCA does not override a party’s obligation to produce relevant
electronically stored information in a criminal proceeding.166 To the contrary, a
party must produce evidence of a crime that is within its possession, custody,
or control.167 Thus, a U.S. court can compel a party to execute an authorization
for the release of social media content. With an executed authorization, a

160

See generally Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2013).
162 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c).
163 See generally Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 965.
164 See May I Obtain Any Account Information or Account Contents Using a Subpoena?, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/help/133221086752707 (last visited Nov. 5, 2015).
165 One of the earliest cases to address the issue, Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., concluded that the
SCA prohibited a social-networking site from producing a user’s account contents in response to a civil
discovery subpoena. Crispin, 717 F. Supp. at 991. In that case, the defendants served subpoenas on several
third parties, including Facebook and MySpace, seeking communications between the plaintiff and another
individual. Id. at 968–69. The plaintiff moved to quash the subpoenas. Id. at 969. The court held that plaintiff
had standing to bring the motion, explaining that “an individual has a personal right in information in his or
her profile and inbox on a social-networking site and his or her webmail inbox in the same way that an
individual has a personal right in employment and bank records.” Id. at 974. Moreover, the court determined
that the providers were electronic communication service (ECS) providers under the SCA, id. at 982, 989, and
were thus prohibited from disclosing information contained in “electronic storage,” id. at 989.
166 See generally Paul W. Grimm et al., Back to the Future: Lorraine v. Markel American Insurance Co.
and New Findings on the Admissibility of Electronically Stored Information, 42 AKRON L. REV. 357 (2009).
167 Id. at 413.
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properly issued subpoena, and, in most cases, a reasonably small payment for
associated costs, litigants can obtain all information related to a user’s social
media account.168 How this plays out in a criminal proceeding is subject to
debate.169 What is left even more ambiguous is the ability of a court like the
ICC or some foreign national court to exercise jurisdiction over these third
party vendors and order them to turn over their electronically stored evidence
as evidence of a crime. One could imagine that in the U.S., where national
security interests were at stake, subpoenas to obtain such evidence might be
forthcoming. One wonders whether an interim Syrian court’s issuance of
subpoena could have the same impact on Google’s duty to produce its data.
The ubiquity of social networking sites, and the amount of personal
information they contain, makes them a fertile source of potential evidence.
However, the cloud-based, transient, and collaborative nature of these sites
poses challenges unique to these mediums. At the start of a case, international
NGOs should consider methods of data collection that will help to ensure
authentication. Carefully documenting the process of data gathering, and using
sophisticated software where necessary, will help to ensure that the fruits of
discovery are not excluded from evidence due to a failure of authentication.170
Under the ICC and under an inquisitorial system of justice, the use of
hearsay and other evidence is governed by a broader standard of relevance.
The evidence is not rendered inadmissible if it lacks firsthand knowledge,
foundation or authentication, but is given less weight if it lacks any of these
indicia of reliability.171 As a result, in proceedings conducted by the ICC, less
in the way of authentication for admissibility might be required. In addition,
Syrian courts, following civil court procedures most likely will also require
less in the way of authentication of the videos. The alleged expertise of the
court would allow it to make its own determination of the relevance of the

168

Id.
Id.
170 See id. at 370–71.
171 International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the former Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. Doc.
S/25704, at 36, annex (1993) and S/25704/Add.1 (1993), adopted by Security Council on 25 May 1993, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/827 (1993); ICTY R. P. & Evid. 89(C), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 44 (Feb. 11, 1994) (as amended
Dec. 10, 2009). See also Press Release, United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia, Tadic Case: The Verdict, U.N. Press Release CC/PIO/190-E (May 7, 1997),
http://www.icty.org/en/press/tadic-case-verdict.
169
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video, with as much of a worry that it will be prejudiced by seeing the video
before judging finally its authentication.
If the Syrians choose a formal judicial process, either by using the ICC, a
Supreme Constitutional Court given jurisdiction over those not granted
amnesty, or a hybrid court—part Syrian and part international—it will have
much of the evidence it may need to connect individual actors with individual
acts of murder and indiscriminate use of force.172 Of course, the defense might
raise the “Nuremberg Defense,” that the person responsible for using chemical
weapons, beheading a person, or killing innocent civilians, was ordered to
commit the act by someone who would kill him or his family if he did not so
act.173 These will present important issues for the tribunal to decide and will
raise the possibility that the defendant will likely not be found guilty. On the
other hand, there would not be the possibility most often raised in past cases
where the individual denies any knowledge of or involvement in the act
allegedly committed.174 For example, an NGO conflict mapping project likely
includes the coding and preservation of YouTube videos and their
correspondence with evidence of other reports of surrounding events in similar
locations. Such evidence presents the possibility that the truth will be known,
and therefore that any reconciliation that might occur will be based on a better
understanding of who did what to whom.
B. Use of Social Media Evidence by TRCs or Local Informal Mediation
Bodies
Just as in cases where a TRC process has gathered witness statements from
victims, the use of corroborating evidence can test the truth of what a particular
accused says at a TRC proceeding where he or she is allegedly confessing the
extent of their past doings and sincerely asking for forgiveness.175 Here,
however, the corroborating evidence comes from public sources and so can be
used without violating promises made to the witness during the gathering of
the information.

172 President Assad denies using barrel bombs or chemical weapons, or targeting civilians in any way. See
Syria Conflict: BBC Exclusive Interview with President Bashar al-Assad, BBC NEWS (Feb. 10, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-31327153.
173 Paola Gaeta, The Defence of Superior Orders: The Statute of the International Criminal Court Versus
Customary International Law, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 172, 174 (1999).
174 Id.
175 See generally Michael P. Scharf, Prosecutor v. Tadic, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 593, 718–21 (1997).
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The importance of this kind of evidence should not be overlooked for
judging the efficacy of an informal TRC or other local mediation process. One
of the most important tradeoffs between formal and informal dispute resolution
processes is whether the truth really can ever be known through either process,
and therefore whether appealing to a person’s desire to be reconciled will
produce a true confession of guilt. The informal process is chosen in order to
provide the individual accused with the choice of confessing or facing a formal
judicial proceeding. The reality has been that such a choice is made often with
the almost certain knowledge that, in refusing to testify, the formal process will
be sufficiently delayed, and the capacity of the formal prosecution will be
thereafter so compromised that no proceeding will likely take place.176 The
ability of an interim period dispute resolution process to use the conflict
mapping information is helpful in two ways. First, it helps the Syrians assess
the truthfulness of what the individual accused may say he or she did during a
truth and reconciliation process. Second, it allows for the involvement of
victims of those acts to directly confront the accused and better creates the
possibilities of meaningful forgiveness and reconciliation. This is because true
forgiveness and reconciliation will necessarily involve the victims of those
actors’ wrongdoings. The victims need to understand what was done and why
to truly be able to choose to set it aside and forgive, while not forgetting. The
forgiveness cannot be mandated or dictated by the peacemaking process. For
true forgiveness to occur it must be freely given. Otherwise the resentment
likely to remain in the victims and their families may cause a return to
violence, should the perpetrators stay in the locality.
For Syrian peacemakers, the use of social media may be an important
consideration for deciding whether it will grant immunity for certain acts, to
whom it will grant immunity, and, in addition, which kind of dispute resolution
systems it will adopt for which kind of disputes. The resolution system may
very well suggest that immunity be given to Assad and/or key military figures
in exchange for an end to the conflict, a set time for transitioning out of
leadership, immediate removal from their involvement in the government,
and/or their leaving Syria altogether. For those that remain, the question will
be, more specifically put, what was their individual responsibility for the use of

176 The use of TRCs in Liberia and Kenya produced no referrals to formal judicial proceedings, and
impunity for those who choose not to submit to the process. Neela Ghoshal, Four Years After Kenya’s PostElection Violence, Impunity Reigns, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 9, 2011), http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/12/09/
four-years-after-kenya-s-post-election-violence-impunity-reigns.

ZWIER GALLEYSPROOFS2

210

12/14/2015 11:03 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

barrel bombs, chemical weapons, torture tactics, or the disappearance of
civilians. These individuals may be tried according to formal procedures that
provide due process protections. Alternatively, they could face a TRC process.
The individuals could make that choice knowing that some conflict mapping
evidence might be available that will test the sincerity of their confessions, as
well as the impact on victims and the victims’ willingness to forgive.
For those others—ISIS, al Qaeda, or other opposition group members—a
different dispute resolution process might be employed. First, it must be
recognized that the number of ISIS members who would likely remain or
survive after the conflict is over between opposition groups and the Assad
government is likely to be a small number. Those that do not die in conflict
may try to flee to reform in a different setting. Those opposition groups
members who remain likely will be those who have participated in the armed
conflict in an attempt to fight what they may have thought was an illegitimate
government at war with its own citizens. Still there may be accusations that
some of these individuals were engaged in criminal acts and perpetrated war
crimes during the conflict. Again, these individuals might be subject to dispute
resolution processes if victims come forward to seek some sort of justice for
what was done to them by these people. In these cases a more informal local or
regional-led dispute resolution process might be employed. The peacemakers
might decide that these individuals should be brought before existing Islamic
courts or local councils to consider what they did and why they did it.
In either case, what can result from the existence of this evidence is that
Syrian courts and mediators can obtain a more accurate and complete
understanding of the nature of the accused’s acts and the effects on the victims.
Armed with such information, the tribunal can better assess the truthfulness of
any confession that is given and the sincerity of the person’s remorse. As a
result, victims can also be more readily identified and brought into the
reconciliation process, and the possibility of meaningful reconciliation can be
more readily provided for. In addition, the international community can more
readily assist in this reconciliation process without intruding on whomever is
making the decision, or what punishment, compensation, or ritual of
confession is provided for.
CONCLUSION
Any transition that Syria will face will have to navigate through a number
of potential obstacles on the way to a sustainable peace. The first obstacle will
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be what Syrians will decide to do about those who may have committed past
atrocities, including Assad, members of his military and security forces, as
well as any of the rebel groups that also engaged in war crimes.177 A legal
strategy that will require Assad to power share, on a way toward a more
democratic form of government that is inclusive of all tribal and religious
groups, will likely have to include both prisoner releases and some sort of
amnesty for top leaders. The remaining disputes between Syrian citizen victims
and the perpetrators of violence during the interim period will have to be
handled by both informal, and then formal means. Perhaps the best mix of
dispute resolution will include both informal dispute resolution mechanisms
that draw on local leadership to help resolve them, followed by more formal
methods—most probably hybrid regional courts run by both Syrians and
international players committed to both the continued peaceful resolution of
these disputes, and the building of religious freedoms and minority protections
to keep the “winners” from seeking retribution and imposing their will on the
“losers.”
Surprisingly, the role that social media will play will most likely
complicate the transition for peacemakers. As we have seen, social media has a
positive impact on peacemaking in at least two ways. First, it helps
humanitarian groups identify those rebels who may have engaged in war
crimes, which avoids giving aid and assistance to the wrong parties both during
the conflict and during the transition. Second, social media also helps postconflict to match accused war criminals with victims in a way that may bring
about more truth speaking, and more forgiveness and reconciliation.
What is complicating the process is that social media also makes possible
the more successful prosecution of those who have committed war crimes.
How can peacemakers make promises of amnesty to those disputants who are
likely war criminals when they know that evidence from social media may lead
others to want to prosecute them for their crimes? The “fog of war” may have
lifted sufficiently so that the nature of the choices available to Syrians presents
an overwhelming ethical dilemma to the possibility of making peace. How will
Syrians resolve the choice between peace and justice, or decide who to give
amnesty to, and who they should insist on prosecuting in order to insure that,
in the future, no Syrian actor uses war crimes to promote self and tribe?
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See infra Part II.
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What is clear is that peacemakers need to be careful not to be seen as
gathering evidence for prosecution, otherwise their role as peacemaker will be
compromised. At the same time, social media evidence can serve two different
purposes in two different phases of the peace process after the conflict has
stopped. In the first phase, the evidence from social media can be used to bring
about mediations that lead to better reconciliations. In the second phase, where
reconciliation has not occurred because the perpetrators are neither forthright
nor sincere in their participation in the mediation, evidence from social media
sources can be made available to prosecute in more formal judicial settings.
Justification for its use comes in the form of classic evidentiary principles
based on reliable foundations, relevance, and authentication. In the process of
their recruitment of others to their side of the conflict, there should be little
hesitation by hybrid courts to use such evidence to bring these war criminals to
justice, especially where such evidence is produced by recalcitrant groups
themselves.

